

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0238

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INFO ALL MBFR CAPITALS 0090

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0133

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AHG MESSAGE TO NAC ON

DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES

AT ITS JULY 3 MEETING, THE AHG APPROVED FOR TRANSMITTAL
TO THE NAC THE TEXT OF AN ANALYTICAL PAPER ON DEFINITION
OF GROUND FORCES WITH COVER NOTE. TEXTS FOLLOW:

BEGIN TEXT//OF COVER NOTE:

MESSAGE FROM THE AD HOC GROUP TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES

1. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY CHALLENGED THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES ACCORDING TO UNIFORM. THEY HAVE CLAIMED THAT THIS DEFINITION FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ANOMALIES IN THE FORCE ORGANIZATIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND, IN EFFECT, ARTIFICIALLY ENLARGES

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THE NUMERICAL DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES

OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE ATTACHED PAPER ANALYSES THIS PROBLEM AND SUGGESTS POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING WITH IT. SINCE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO ENGAGE IN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH THE EAST DURING THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND, THE AD HOC GROUP REQUESTS GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL IF POSSIBLE BY SEPTEMBER 16, 1974.

2. ANY CHANGE IN THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO MEET WARSAW PACT CONCERNS WOULD BE OFFERED BY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ONLY IN RETURN FOR SPECIFIC EASTERN MOVES OF VALUE TO THE ALLIES. FURTHER CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PRECISE WAY IN WHICH EASTERN MOVES MIGHT BE OBTAINED WHEN THE COUNCIL'S GUIDANCE IS RECEIVED.

3. MEANWHILE, THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENT FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE SOME RESPONSE BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND TO EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. IN THE VIEW OF THE AD HOC GROUP, A RESPONSE IS NEEDED WHICH, WHILE IN NO WAY PREJUDICING THE OUTCOME OF THE ALLIANCE'S CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM, WILL GIVE A SIGNAL TO EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT THEIR CRITICISMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND THAT THE ALLIES ARE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO DISCUSS WITH THE EAST POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES TO DEAL WITH THOSE ANOMALIES TO WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION. SUCH A RESPONSE IS NEEDED NOW IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION AND TO ENSURE THAT THE EAST WILL BE READY TO GIVE CONSIDERED REACTIONS AFTER THE RECESS. THIS RESPONSE WOULD BE MADE IN GENERAL TERMS, DESIGNED TO DEFEND THE ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES.

4. ACCORDINGLY, AT ONE OF THE TWO REMAINING INFORMAL SESSIONS BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT

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NEGOTIATING ROUND, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS INTEND TO REFER TO WARSAW PACT CRITICISMS OF THE "UNIFORM" CRITERION FOR DEFINING GROUND FORCES. THEY WILL SUMMARISE THE RATIONALE FOR THIS CRITERION BROADLY IN THE TERMS USED BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE AT THE INFORMAL SESSION ON 8 APRIL, AND WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT:

(A) THEY REMAIN WILLING TO SEEK TO ESTABLISH

WITH THE EAST A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS;

(B) THE MOST LOGICAL WAY OF DEFINING GROUND
FORCES IS TO IDENTIFY THEM ACCORDING TO THE
UNIFORM THEY WEAR, AS THE ALLIES HAVE DONE;

(C) NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT,
OWING TO DIFFERING NATIONAL METHODS OF ORGANISING
ARMED FORCES, TO DEFINE GROUND FORCES BY USING
THE CRITERION OF UNIFORM DOES RESULT IN A FEW
INCONSISTENCIES;

(D) IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING A COMMON
DEFINITION, THE ALLIES ARE EXAMINING HOW TO DEAL
WITH THESE INCONSISTENCIES OF ORGANIZATION;

(E) THE ALLIES HAVE NOT YET COME TO ANY
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS MATTER. THEY CONTINUE TO

BELIEVE THAT THE CRITERION OF UNIFORM IS THE RIGHT
WAY TO DEFINE GROUND FORCES. THEY ARE, HOWEVER,
READY TO RECONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THEIR
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WITH A VIEW TO DEALING
WITH SOME OF THE INCONSISTENCIES WHICH EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED;

(F) THEY EXPECT TO BE READY TO DISCUSS THESE
ISSUES WITH THE EAST EARLY IN THE NEXT NEGOTIATING
ROUND. END TEXT OF COVER NOTE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0133

FROM US REP MBFR

BEGIN TEXT OF ANALYTICAL PAPER.

DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES

I. INTRODUCTION

1. WHILE THE GROUND FORCES OF EST AND WEST IN THE MBFR REDUCTION AREA ARE GENERALLY ORGANIZED ON SIMILAR LINES, THERE ARE A FEW DIVERGENCES FROM THIS NORM. WE CALL THESE DIVERGENCES "ANOMALIES". THE EAST HAS REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IS BIASED BECAUSE OF ITS UNFAIR TREATMENT OF "ANOMALIES" IN THE FORCE STRUCTURES ON THE TWO SIDES.

2. THIS PAPER SUGGESTS SOME POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEFENDING THE ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES FROM EASTERN CHARGES. THE APPROACHES DISCUSSED WOULD NOT REQUIRE GIVING THE EAST ANY ADDITIONAL DATA WHEN THEY ARE INITIALLY BROACHED.

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3. THIS PAPER IS WRITTEN ON THE BASIS THAT THE ALLIED AIM OF CONFINING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO GROUND FORCES REMAINS UNCHANGED. IT DOES NOT THEREFORE ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AND, IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT, AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, NOR DOES IT PREJUDICE THE STUDY OF THIS QUESTION. IF AIR FORCES MANPOWER WERE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE BALANCE IN SOME WAY, THE PROBLEM OF THE ANOMALIES WOULD TAKE ON A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE. THIS SUBJECT HAS ALREADY BEEN RAISED WITH THE COUNCIL BY THE AD HOC GROUP.

4. THE DATA USED IN THE CALCULATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS PAPER ARE MBFR WORKING GROUP DATA, INCLUDING NEW WARSAW PACT FIGURES RECENTLY RECOMMENDED BY THE WORKING GROUP FOR MBFR PURPOSES. IN ONE INSTANCE, THE PAPER USES A US ESTIMATE, WHICH IS DERIVED FROM DETAILED BACKUP FIGURES TO THE NEW TOTALS RECENTLY APPROVED BY THE WORKING GROUP.

II. NEGOTIATING BACKGROUND

5. OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY CLAIMED THAT THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IS INEQUITABLE. THEY HAVE ON AT LEAST SIX OCCASIONS CHARGED THAT THE ALLIED APPROACH OF COUNTING ALL UNIFORMED ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES WHO ARE IN THE ARMY DOES NOT DEAL FAIRLY WITH THE ANOMALIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PACT AND NATO FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

6. THESE ANOMALIES ARE: (A) THE FACT THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, WHO ARE SEPARATELY ORGANIZED IN THE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS OF THOSE COUNTRIES, HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY NATO AS BEING IN

THE ARMY. (US AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION ARE IN THE ARMY AND HAVE BEEN COUNTED WITH THE GROUND FORCES.) HOWEVER, COMPARABLE PERSONNEL IN THE GDR NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MOST NON-US PERSONNEL WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION IN NATO ARE IN THE AIR FORCES; (B) THE FACT THAT GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL ARE, WITH MINOR
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EXCEPTIONS, IN THE ARMY IN NATO FORCES, WHILE COMPARABLE WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AIR FORCES; (C) THE

FACT THAT ALL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE UNITS IN THE REDUCTION AREA ARE MANNED BY ARMY TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES, EXCEPT FOR FRG PERSHING UNITS, WHICH ARE MANNED BY AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, AND WHOSE PERSONNEL HAVE THEREFORE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE NATO GROUND FORCE TOTAL.

7. IN PARTICULAR, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CLAIMED THAT THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN UNFAIR IN INCLUDING PACT AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL FOR THE WARSAW PACT, WHILE PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE SAME FUNCTION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN NATO FORCES HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM THE ALLIED TOTAL OF NATO GROUND FORCES. THEY HAVE ALSO ARGUED THAT FRG AIR FORCE TROOPS MANNING PERSHING SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL, IN ADDITION THEY HAVE STATED THAT PACT HELICOPTER UNITS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ARE "ARMY AVIATION" AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED GROUND FORCES.

8. THE EASTERN MOTIVE IN RAISING THESE ISSUES MAY BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIED APPROACH OF SEPARATING OUT GROUND FORCES FROM THE TOTAL COMPLEX OF FORCES, AND PROPOSING REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES ONLY, IS IMPRACTICAL AND THAT ALL FORCES MUST BE

CONSIDERED. A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WEST HAS EXAGGERATED THE SIZE OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TOTALS OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON EACH SIDE. IT IS ALSO THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE SEEKING A WORKING DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA USABLE FOR REDUCTIONS.

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INFO ALL MBFR CAPITALS 0092

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FROM US REP MBFR

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED NEGOTIATING TACTICS

9. REPEATED EASTERN ATTACKS ON THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES CANNOT REMAIN UNANSWERED IN FUTURE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. MOREOVER, THE NEED TO ANSWER THESE ATTACKS COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ALLIES TO MOVE TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES BY OFFERING, IN RETURN FOR CORRESPONDING EASTERN MOVEMENT, TO CONSIDER MAKING LIMITED CHANGES IN THE PRESENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES TO DEAL WITH ANOMALIES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST IN FORCE STRUCTURES ON THE TWO SIDES. INDEED, IF WE ARE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF OUR CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS

LEADING TO COMMON CEILING, WE CAN ONLY EXPECT TO DO SO ON THE BASIS OF DEFINITIONS WHICH ARE LOGICALLY DEFENSIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE OBJECTIVE VALIDITY FOR THE DISPARITIES WE HAVE INDICATED.

10. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MAKE THIS AN APPROPRIATE
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MOVE FOR THE ALLIES:

A. UNLESS THE SITUATION IN VIENNA CHANGES, THE ALLIES MAY SOON AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND HAVE CONCLUDED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC OF PHASING IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST. THEY WILL NEED TO START DEVELOPMENT OF ANOTHER AREA OF DISCUSSION IF THEY ARE TO MAINTAIN ALLIED INITIATIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. IT IS DESIRABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOPIC OF DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO THIS EXTENT TO KEEP DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE ALLIED POSITION.

C. NOW THAT THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE HAS RAISED HIS CHARGE OF UNFAIRNESS IN PLENARY SESSIONS, THE RISK IS INCREASED THAT THE PACT MAY GO PUBLIC WITH THIS POINT AND ADD IT TO OTHER CHARGES OF LACK OF REALISM AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE ALLIED POSITION.

D. VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, DIFFERENCES OF ORGANIZATION BETWEEN FORCES OF EAST AND WEST DO EXIST, AND WILL HAVE TO BE TO BE DEALT WITH. THEREFORE, A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES BASED SOLELY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORM CANNOT BE MAINTAINED COMPLETELY INTACT. HENCE, MERE INSISTENCE ON THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE AND WOULD TEND TO UNDERMINE ALLIED NEGOTIATING CREDIBILITY WITH THE EAST.

11. DISCUSSION OF A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND THE CONNECTED DISCUSSION OF DATA COULD ALSO SERVE AS ONE WAY OF BRINGING THE EAST INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING. JUDGING FROM STRONG EASTERN CRITICISM, THE EAST IS LIKELY TO RESIST DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING IF THE TOPIC IS RAISED AS SUCH, AND INDIRECT APPROACHES MAY BE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

12. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO PUT FORWARD SPECIFIC DATA (BEYOND THE FIGURES ALREADY PUT FORWARD BY THE ALLIEDS) WHEN RAISING INITIALLY WITH THE EAST POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS
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OF THE PRESENT ALLIED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION WHICH MAY BE NEEDED TO REACH AN AGREED DEFINITION. THE EAST HAS, IN ANY EVENT, INDICATED THAT IT IS NOT YET READY TO PUT FORWARD ANY FIGURES OF ITS OWN. ONE ALLIED AIRM, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF DATA.

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

13. TWO POSSIBLE WAYS OF MODIFYING THE PRESENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES ARE SET FORTH BELOW BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION. THESE HAVE BEEN SELECTED BECAUSE THEY SEEM BEST TO MEET THE TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SITUATION. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT OTHER WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE MAY BE POSSIBLE.

14. THE ALLIES SHOULD IN ANY EVENT "INCLUDE" IN THEIR DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES ABOUT 13,000 PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WHO THE ALLIES HAVE HERETOFORE COUNTED AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND WHO ARE ESTIMATED TO SUPPORT GROUND FORCES. IT WOULD NOT SEEM REASONABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO REFUSE TO INCLUDE PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WHEN THE EASTERN SPOKESMEN STATE THAT SUCH PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS GROUND FORCES AND WHEN NEARLY ALL SIMILAR ALLIED PERSONNEL ARE ALREADY INCLUDED.

CASE 1

15. UNDER CASE 1, THE ALLIES COULD PROPOSE "EXCLUDING THE 41,000 PERSONNEL OF THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS NOW COUNTED IN THE NATO TOTAL OF PACT GROUND FORCES". THESE PERSONNEL PERFORM AREA AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONS SIMILAR TO THE 11,000 GDR AND 29,000 NATO AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WHO ARE ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL BECAUSE THEY WEAR AIR FORCE UNIFORMS. THAT IS, THEY ARE ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS, EMPLOYED TO DEFEND GEOGRAPHIC POINTS OR AREAS, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ORGANIC GROUND FORCE AIR DEFENSE, THAT IS ELEMENTS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF A GROUND FORCE COMMANDER TO BE USED FOR DEFENSE OF FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND. ELEMENTS OF THE US AND SOVIET ARMIES WHO HAVE AN AREA AIR DEFENSE FUNCTION WOULD CONTINUE TO BE COUNTED IN THE GROUND FORCES. THEY ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL IN NUMBER (12,000 US, SECRET

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13,000 SOVIET). AS STATED ABOVE, THE 13,000 PACT PERSONNEL WHO MAN GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER UNITS

WOULD BE ADDED TO THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL.

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INFO ALL MBFR CAPITALS 0093

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FROM US REP MBFR

CASE 2

16. UNDER CASE 2, THE ALLIES COULD PROPOSE "EXCLUDING" FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS "ALL AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES" WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS IN THE AREA AIR DEFENSE. IN ADDITION TO THE STEPS DESCRIBED IN CASE 1, THIS WOULD INVOLVE EXCLUDING ABOUT 13,000 SOVIET AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND TROOPS FROM THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL AND 14,000 NATO AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND TROOPS (INCLUDING 12,000 US) FROM THE NATO TOTAL.

V. COMPARISON AND EVALUSTION OF CASE 1 AND CASE 2

17. BOTH CASES WOULD "EXCLUDE"THE LARGEST DISPUTED COMPONENT-- ABOUT 41,000 GROUND PERSONNEL BELONGING TO POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS""FROM THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL. AS NOTED ABOVE, THESE PERSONNEL ARE SIMILAR IN FUCTION TO 11,000 GDR AND 29,000 NATO AIR

DEFENSE PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOT COUNTED IN GROUND FORCE TOTALS.

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18. BOTH CASES WOULD HAVE ROUGHLY THE SAME EFFECT IN REDUCING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA. CASE 1 REDUCES THIS GAP BY 28,000; CASE 2 REDUCES THIS GAP BY 27,000. DATA INCREASES IN TOTAL SOVIET FORCES NOW AVAILABLE TO NATO MAKE NO DIFFERENCE AS REGARDING COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASES. SEE PART III OF TABLES 1 AND 2, ATTACHED, FOR DETAILS.

19. IN BOTH CASES, THE EXCLUSION OF THE 41,000 POLISH AND CZECH PERSONNEL, PARTLY OFFSET BY THE INCLUSION OF THE 13,000 PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL, WOULD DIMINISH TO A LIMITED EXTENT THE OVERALL DISPARITY BETWEEN PACT AND NATO GROUND FORCES AND CUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF FORCES THE ALLIES ARE CALLING ON THE EAST TO REDUCE TO REACH THE SUGGESTED 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING. THIS APPROACH COULD HELP TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING AND THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES SOMEWHAT LESS UNATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST.

20. FROM A CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINT, CASE 2 IS MORE EVEN-HANDED BECAUSE IT APPLIES THE SAME FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA TO ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, CASE 2 GOES BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM THE EAST HAS RAISED, IN THAT IT WOULD ALSO EXCLUDE 13,000 SOVIET AND 14,000 NATO AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND TROOPS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT OBJECTED TO THE INCLUSION OF THESE SOVIET AND NATO TROOPS IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, SPECIFICALLY OBJECTED TO THE FACT THAT GROUND ELEMENTS OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS ARE INCLUDED IN ALLIED TOTALS FOR GROUND FORCES, AND MANY COMPARABLE NATO PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT.

21. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, CASE 2 WOULD REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONAL DETAILED NEGOTIATION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS NOT NECESSARY FOR CASE 1. THIS IS BECAUSE BOTH SIDES WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO AGREE ON ESTABLISHING TWO NEW AGREED SUB-CATEGORIES OF ORGANIC GROUND FORCE AIR DEFENSE AND AREA AIR DEFENSE AND DECIDE WHICH SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THESE CATEGORIES. THIS MIGHT NOT BE EASY. THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK AIR DEFENSE ELEMENTS EXCLUDED IN CASE 1, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE ALL PART OF A SEPARATE, IDENTIFIABLE ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITY SPECIFICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR AREA AIR

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DEFENSE, AND THEIR EXCLUSION WOULD REQUIRE NO DEFINITIONAL AGREEMENT OF THIS TYPE. BECAUSE IT WOULD EXCLUDE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, BUT CONTINUES TO INCLUDE STATE-IONED US, UK, BELGIAN AND SOVIET AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, CASE 1 MIGHT PROVIDE THE EAST A SLIGHT OPENING TO ARGUE THAT ALL STATIONED FORCES SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM INDIGENOUS FORCES. THIS RISK DOES NOT ARISE WITH CASE 2.

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22. AS COMPARED WITH CASE 1, CASE 2 EXCLUDES FROM THE REDUCTION BASE 12,000 US (PLUS 2,000 OTHER NATO PERSONNEL) AND 13,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL. THIS ACTION WOULD REQUIRE EXEMPTING THESE SOVIET (AND US) GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA FROM THE COMMON CEILING. AS LONG AS AN ARGUMENT DEALT WITH GROUND FORCES ALONE, CASE 2 COULD THUS COMPLICATE THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROBLEM FOR THE WEST IN THAT THE EXCLUDED CATEGORY OF SOVIET AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE LIMITED UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH SET A CEILING ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

23. BOTH CASES WOULD IN FACT DIMINISH THE GAP BY ROUGHLY THE SAME AMOUNT, ABOUT 28,000. IN CASE 2, THIS FACT WOULD BECOME EVIDENT TO THE EAST ONLY AFTER DETAILED FIGURES HAD BEEN GIVEN THE EAST AND DISCUSSED WITH THEM. FROM THE EASTERN POINT OF VIEW, CASE 1 WOULD HAVE THE ATTRACTION THAT IT WOULD CLEARLY, WITHOUT THE NEED TO DISCLOSE FIGURES, DECREASE THEIR REDUCTION BASE WHILE LEAVING THE WEST'S REDUCTION BASE UNCHANGED.

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24. ONE FACTOR SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND IN CONSIDERING BOTH CASES DESCRIBED IN THIS PAPER. IT IS NOT A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD DEPART FROM OBJECTIVE CRITERIA IN ORDER TO ACCEPT A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES WITH THE EAST WHICH WAS PURELY AN EMPTY FORMULA COVERING CONTINUING GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES, OR THAT WESTERN PRESS AND POLITICAL OPINION WOULD NOT RAPIDLY SEE BEHIND SUCH A PAPER FORMULA AND UNDERSTAND IT FOR WHAT IT WAS. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT THE EAST WOULD CONSIDER EITHER OF THE CASES DESCRIBED IN THIS PAPER OR ANY WESTERN PROPOSAL WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF REDUCING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES, AS AN INVITATION FROM THE WEST TO SEEK SUCH A PURELY OPTICAL SOLUTION. THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE CARE IN PUTTING FORWARD ANY PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT REDUCE THE DISPARITY TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT ANY ADJUSTMENTS IN FORCE DEFINITION OR FORCE LEVEL ESTIMATES WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIAL.

VI. ALTERNATIVES.

25. THE ABOVE CASES ARE PUT FORWARD FOR THE SAKE OF ILLUSTRATION ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM WITHIN THE AD HOC GROUP. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE VARIANTS OF THESE CASES WHICH ARE BOTH LOGICAL AND CONSISTENT WITH WESTERN NEGOTIATING AIRMS. HOWEVER, THE ONLY LOGICAL FURTHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH THE AD HOC GROUP HAS SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY WOULD BE, INSTEAD OF SUBTRACTING SOME OR ALL OF AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL FROM THE TOTAL WHILE ADDING PACT HELICOPTER AND POSSIBLY FRG PERSHINGRR PERSONNEL, TO ADOPT THE OPPOSITE APPROACH OF "INCLUDING IN THE TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES ALL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS." THUS, ALL ANOMALOUS FORCE ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ADDING TO THE PRESENT GROUND FORCE TOTALS: 29,000 NATO AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN AIR FORCE UNIFORMS, INCLUDING ABOUT 20,000 FRG AIRMENT, AND 11,000 GDR AIR DEFENSE COMMAND PERSONNEL IN AIR FORCE

UNIFORMS.

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26. THOUGH THERE IS A CERTAIN LOGIC TO THIS APPROACH, IT WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING AIRMS. BY INCLUDING A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, IT WOULD SERIOUSLY BLUR THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, PROVIDING THE EAST WITH ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING ALL AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, IF THE 700,000 COMMON CEILING GOAL IS RETAINED, ALLIED REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO REACH IT WOULD BE INCREASED BY 29,000. FINALLY, THIS APPROACH WOULD DO NOTHING TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT ITSELF ANYMORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST.

27. THE ILLUSTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES DESCRIBED IN THIS PAPER DO NOT DEAL WITH THE 3,700 FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO MAN PERSHING UNITS. THE EAST IS LIKELY TO PLACE INCREASING WEIGHT ON INCLUSION OF FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL IN THE NATO GROUND FORCE TOTAL. SINCE FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL ARE THE SOLE ANOMALY AMONG ALL SSM PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, THE EAST HAS A STRONG OBJECTIVE CASE. THE NUMBER INVOLVED IS RELATIVELY SMALL. INCLUSION OF THIS GROUP NEED NOT OPEN THE WAY FOR GENERAL INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, BECAUSE IT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ARGUED THAT THE ALLIES HAD MERELY REDRESSED A UNIQUE ANOMALY IN THE SSM FIELD. FOR THESE REASONS, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE AT SOME FUTURE POINT FOR THE ALLIES TO DISCUSS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL ON THE WESTERN SIDE WITH AN EYE TO ITS POSSIBLE LATER USE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST.

VIIM CONSLUSION

28. THIS PAPER EXPLAINS WHY SOME ADJUSTMENT IN THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. IF THE ALLIANCE DECIDES ON SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT MAKE MOVES OF THIS KIND EXCEPT IN RETURN FOR SPECIFIC EASTERN MOVES OF VALUE TO THE ALLIES. SUCH EASTERN MOVES MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE, INCLUDE AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES FOR NEGOTIATION PURPOSES, PLUS SOME EASTERN MOVEMENT TOWARDS AN AGREED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, OR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE DATA ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

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29. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF ADJUSTING THE
CURRENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES TO TAKE ACCOUNT
OF ACTUAL ANOMALIES BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL AND THAT THE
COUNCIL PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

END TAXT OF ANALYTICAL PAPER.

THE THREE TABLES ATTACHED TO THE PAPER WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.
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